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Abstract
I introduce behavioral asset pricing rules into a wider dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium framework. Asset price bubbles emerge endogenously within the model. I nd that in this
model the only monetary policy that would be likely to enhance welfare is a counter-intuitive
running with the wind policy. I conclude that the optimal policy is highly dependent on
the nature of the behavioral rules that are stipulated. Given that monetary authorities have
limited information about the ways in which agents actually behave, a systematic monetary
policy response to asset price misalignments is unlikely to enhance welfare.
1 Introduction
The use of asset prices in monetary policy formulation has a long and chequered history. For the
majority of history, monetary policy has been inextricably linked to asset prices. The value of
money was tied either to the value of precious metals or to the value of other currencies almost
continuously up until the nal decades of the twentieth century.
However, a near-consensus evolved within the literature over the latter decades of the twentieth
century. It held that monetary policy should respond to expected ination and possibly to the
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output gap, but should not be directly inuenced by asset price movements. The intuition for
this view is straightforward. In a world characterized by rational expectations, asset prices are
simply equal to the discounted sum of the expected future returns to holding those assets. Asset
prices simply reect other fundamental variables in the economy and so monetary policy cannot be
improved by targeting asset prices over and above the extent to which it targets those fundamental
variables, namely expected ination and output.
There has been some dissent to this view (for example Cecchetti et al 2000) and, furthermore,
some evidence exists to suggest that central banks do indeed take asset price movements into
consideration when setting interest rates (Mishkin 2007, Cecchetti et al 2000). Unsurprisingly,
most of this dissent is premised on the idea that asset prices may not be a perfect reection of the
economys fundamentals, that irrational bubbles may exist.
The existing literature on the implications of asset price bubbles for monetary policy, which I
briey review below, fails to reach a consensus on whether or not monetary policy should target
such bubbles. In this paper, I intend to contribute to this debate by considering the e¤ects of
asset price targeting within a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model in which
expectations of future asset prices are based on simple heuristical rules, as suggested by much of
the behavioral nance literature.
This represents a signicant innovation when compared to previous contributions to the debate,
which have been based either on highly stylized models or on more highly-specied models, but
which treat the asset price bubble as an exogenous process.
I nd that with the asset bubble endogenized within the model, monetary policy can have
perverse e¤ects on the development of the bubble. This observation suggests that the monetary
authorities should be weary of targeting asset prices. Indeed, I conclude that any systematic
targeting of asset prices is likely to diminish welfare.
In the next section, I will briey review the existing literature. Subsequently, I will go on to
develop a DSGE model in which asset prices are biased by forecasting which is based on the type of
heuristical rules suggested by Frankel and Froot (1990) and developed by numerous other authors.
I will proceed to analyze the results from the model, and to draw some policy conclusions.
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2 Related Literature
In his now infamous speech to the American Enterprise Institute, the then Federal Reserve chair-
man Alan Greenspan posed a question very similar to the one I am now attempting to answer:
But how do we know when irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values,
which then become subject to unexpected and prolonged contractions as they have in
Japan over the past decade? And how do we factor that assessment into monetary
policy? (Greenspan 1995)
These comments were, at the time, a rare reection on the potential importance of asset mis-pricing
to monetary policy. The slumps in world stock markets which have followed, in the early 2000s
and during the recent credit crunch, have strengthened the view that asset price bubbles exist as
an empirical fact. However, the literature relating to the subject is still relatively sparse.
Bernanke and Gertler (2000) provide the original investigation into the implications of asset
price bubbles for monetary policy. They incorporate an exogenous asset bubble into their nancial
accelerator model (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist 1999). The bubble is exogenously determined
by a simple probabilistic rule. The bubble grows until such time as it bursts, but the expected
discounted value of the bubble decays over time. When the bubble bursts, the asset price goes
instantaneously back to the fundamental value.
Bernanke and Gertler simulate their model under two alternative monetary policy rules. The
rst of these rules has the interest rate responding only to ination, but under the second rule policy
also reacts to the lagged asset price. They conclude that the best policy is to focus aggressively
on ination and ignore asset prices, in that this policy achieves the lowest variance of output and
ination. Their simulations show that a monetary policy rule which accommodates ination but
responds to asset prices actually leads to a decline in output and ination during a positive bubble.
The rise in interest rates in response to the bubble drives down fundamental values to a greater
extent than the bubble stimulates them. When the monetary policy rule aggressively targets
ination, they nd that adding in the response to asset prices makes little di¤erence, though what
di¤erence it does make is still destabilizing.
Cecchetti et al (2000) reach very di¤erent conclusions from the same model. They criticize
Bernanke and Gertler for considering too narrow a set of policy rules and for failing to consider
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di¤erent parameterizations of the New Keynesian Phillipscurve. They report the results of sim-
ulations of the model in which they loosen these restrictions. In particular, they consider:
1. Taylor rules which include the output gap, and which allow for interest rate smoothing.
2. policy rules that react to asset mis-pricing rather than to the asset price itself. In other
words, they assume that the central bank can distinguish between asset price movements
caused by changes to the fundamentals, and those which are caused by a bubble.
3. the implications of making agents more or less backward looking in their wage setting. In
other words, they vary the weights on past ination and future expected ination in the New
Keynesian Phillipscurve.
They report that in the majority of cases, it is optimal for interest rates to respond to asset
mis-pricing.
They further criticize Bernanke and Gertler on the basis that both the bubbles size and du-
ration, and the level of leverage in the economy are treated as exogenous. They argue that when
private agents expect the monetary authorities to prick a bubble, the bubble is less likely to
appear in the rst place. Alternatively, if the bank can tighten policy in the formative stage of the
bubble it will mitigate the worst excesses that might otherwise occur. The authors also contend
that if it is known that the monetary authorities will react to asset prices, then rms and house-
holds will react to stock market buoyancy by reducing their leverage, and this will dampen the
e¤ect of the nancial accelerator.
Bordo and Jeanne (2002) suggest that the best way to think of asset price targeting is as costly
insurance against nancial crisis. In their highly stylized model, they incorporate a nancial shock
whose distribution depends on rmsindebtedness. The justication for the endogeneity of this
shock is similar to Bernanke and Gertlers explanation of the nancial accelerator. It lies in the
fact that nancial intermediaries rely on collateral to reduce nancial frictions. Collateral in turn
is driven by asset prices. Given that monetary policy can a¤ect asset prices, and thereby debt
accumulation, it also a¤ects the probability of a damaging nancial shock. A proactive monetary
policy can thus prevent a credit crunch from emerging in the future. However, such a policy incurs
a cost in terms of sacricing short-run macroeconomic objectives.
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They nd that the optimal monetary policy depends decisively upon the optimism of the private
sector. When optimism is low, rms do not leverage themselves very highly, so the risk of a credit
crunch is low, and the cost of a proactive policy is not worth bearing. As the private sector becomes
more optimistic they increase their leverage and the probability of a credit crunch increases. It
becomes worthwhile to insure against that risk with a proactive monetary policy. However, as
optimism increases, there is also an increase in the cost of the proactive monetary policy. The cost
increases because the more optimistic private agents are, the greater the interest rate that needs
to be set to curb their indebtedness. At some point, the cost associated with distorting monetary
policy becomes so high that it no longer pays to insure against the credit crunch.
In this way, Bordo and Jeanne conclude that there is no simple rule as to how central banks
should respond to asset prices. The optimal policy depends on the economic circumstances in a
complex, non-linear way that cannot be represented in a straightforward Taylor rule.
Bean (2004) examines the e¤ects of targeting asset prices within a simple New Keynesian
model. His key conclusion is that expectations of future policy actions are at least as signicant
as current policy in preventing asset booms and busts. In his model, credit crunches occur with a
given probability, but their severity depends upon the level of indebtedness in the economy. In the
model, higher interest rates reduce capital formation and associated indebtedness, but the higher
interest payments exactly o¤set this so that the output cost of a credit crunch is una¤ected. In
this way, current monetary policy does not have any impact on the severity of a credit crunch.
However, monetary policy can e¤ect the severity of future credit crunches through its impact on
future expected output, and therefore on current capital accumulation and leverage. Hence, a
central bank may nd it optimal to use monetary policy commitments to limit the build up of
leverage in the economy. The optimal commitment is in fact to stabilize output by less than the
discretionary optimum when a credit crunch occurs. This counter-intuitive result arises because,
by committing to a larger output cost if a credit crunch does occur, the central bank is disciplining
private agents to limit their indebtedness.
In summary, a number of themes recur within the literature:
1. There is great di¢ culty in identifying whether asset price movements are driven by changes
in the fundamentals or by noise trading. It is only with the benet of hindsight that bubbles
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become recognizable. For many authors (see for example Greenspan 2002) this provides an
overwhelming reason for not attempting to target asset prices. Cecchetti et al (2000), on
the other hand, make an analogy between the concept of a fundamental asset price and the
concept of potential output. They argue that measuring asset mis-pricing is of a similar
complexity as measuring the output gap.
2. The macroeconomic consequences of bubbles are relatively mild in the absence of some kind of
nancial accelerator e¤ect. As Bean (2004) states, if the only macroeconomic consequences
of booms and busts in asset prices were via conventional wealth e¤ects on aggregate demand,
then they would constitute little more than a nuisance to monetary policy makers. It is only
when falling asset prices combine with nancial market frictions to cause credit rationing and
credit crunches that signicant welfare losses occur.
3. A number of authors argue that the magnitude of the monetary policy response that would
be needed to correct for a bubble would risk causing serious harm to the real economy.
Greenspan (2002) provides a selection of empirical evidence that suggests that the response
of asset prices to monetary policy is weak. Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2008) estimate
VARs in order to assess the responses of equity and house prices to monetary policy across 17
di¤erent countries. They concur that using monetary policy to o¤set asset price movements in
an attempt to guard against nancial instability may have large e¤ects on economic activity.
4. Conversely, Bean (2004) highlights the way in which a commitment to future policy may have
signicant e¤ects on the expectations, and hence the behavior, of the private sector. Such
commitments, if they are e¤ective in preventing bubbles from occurring, may never actually
have to be acted upon. Cecchetti et al (2000) illustrate this in a simulation of the Bernanke
and Gertler model. They compare Taylor rules with and without a response to asset prices.
Although the asset targeting rule involves a larger response ex-ante to bubbles, ex-post the
monetary policy response is smaller because private agents fully expect the central banks
response, and so bubbles do not grow as large.
5. Even if it is appropriate to target asset mis-pricing, the timing of monetary policy poses
signicant di¢ culties. The lags in the transmission of monetary policy mean that it may be
counter-productive to respond to a bubble with a monetary tightening. If the bubble bursts
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of its own accord, just as the monetary tightening takes e¤ect, then the economy will be hit
simultaneously by two deationary forces. Gruen et al (2003) show that the informational
requirements for implementing an asset price targeting policy are particularly stringent when
these timing considerations are taken into account.
In the remainder of this paper I will present a model which will attempt to address the nal
three themes highlighted above. Much has been said on the rst theme, and though I will return to
the issue of measuring mis-pricings in the conclusion, this is not an issue for theoretical modelling.
As far as the second theme is concerned, the importance of nancial accelerator a¤ects is well
established and relatively uncontroversial. Again, therefore, I will not concern myself with this
issue in the model that follows, but will return to the issue in my conclusion.
My main concern in what follows is to provide a new perspective on the asset price targeting
debate. All of the models discussed above either treat the bubble process as exogenous or use some
simple but poorly specied construct to endogenize the bubble process. My main contribution is
to use a specic behavioral framework to generate an endogenous bubble.
A further contribution is that I use a fully specied dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) model to assess di¤erent policy rules. This allows me to do a full welfare analysis, rather
than having to resort to ad hoc assessments using central bank loss functions.
3 The Model
The model I use includes all of the usual features of a standard New Keynesian DSGE model
(see, for example, Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba 2007). Le, Minford and Wickens (2008) have
shown that a model of this general type, with suitable real rigidities, can t the business cycle
behaviour of output, ination and nominal interest rates for the US economy over the period since
the mid-1980s.
The innovation in the model is that I do not impose rational expectations throughout. I
maintain the assumption of rational expectations in the goods and labour markets, but decisions
in the asset market are governed by simple heuristical forecasting rules. This is consistent with
the main contention of the behavioral nance literature. The suggestion is that asset markets are
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prone to uncertainty and speculation in a way in which goods markets and labour markets are not.
For this reason a more complex specication of the forecasting rules employed in asset markets is
needed, rather than a simple appeal to rationality.
In this model agents base their expectations of future asset prices on a choice between two
simple heuristical rules. They choose between a chartist rule and a fundamentalist rule, depending
on the past protability of the rules. This approach to modelling asset prices was rst suggested
by Frankel and Froot (1986), and has been shown to be e¤ective in explaining the time series
characteristics of asset prices. De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) show that a portfolio choice model
in which agents switch between rules in this way gives rise to the fat tails, excess kurtosis and
GARCH properties which are evident in real world asset price series. Ap Gwilym (2009) nds that
such a model cannot be rejected as the data generating process for the FTSE All-Share index.
Here, I will provide a brief overview of the model, concentrating attention on the behavioral
forecasting mechanism. For a fuller exposition of the model, see appendix A.
The model economy consists of a set of households, a set of rms and a bond-issuing government.
The households derive an income by providing a di¤erentiated labour service to the rms, for
which they set a wage rate via a Calvo mechanism. Labour has a utility cost whilst the consumption
of a mixed bundle of output increases utility. Each household maximizes its intertemporal utility,
transferring wealth across time by holding government bonds or through capital ownership.
Each rm sets the price for its di¤erentiated output via a Calvo contract. They maximize
prots subject to a productivity constraint, and pay a wage to labour and a rent to their capital
owners.
I use the artice of a perfectly competitive bundler to transform the di¤erentiated output of
the rms into a homogenous output-bundle which is consumed by the households or reinvested as
capital. I use a similar bundler to transform the di¤erentiated labour into a homogenous labour-
bundle which is used in the productive process by the rms.
The governments only role in this model is as a bond issuer. I assume that the government
sets the nominal interest rate according to a Taylor rule which includes a response to the most
recent asset mis-pricing. The government supplies as many bonds as are demanded at this interest
rate.
I assume that agents operating in the capital markets choose between two simple heuristical
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rules when forecasting future asset prices. At the beginning of each period chartist and fundamen-
talist forecasts of the asset price this period and next are formed. The forecasts of this periods
asset price then determine the actual asset price via a bargaining process. The forecasts of next
periods asset price imply a particular expected return on capital.
The chartist forecasts of the present and next period asset price are a simple extrapolation of
the historical price series:
Ec;t (qt) = qt 1 + c(qt 1   qt 2) + 2c(qt 2   qt 3) + ::: (1)
Ec;t (qt+1) = Ec;t (qt) + c(Ec;t (qt)  qt 1) + 2c(qt 1   qt 2) + ::: (2)
It is arguable as to whether such heuristical rules should be specied in real or nominal terms. I
choose real terms on the basis that, in this paper, I am attempting to address the issue of asset
market bubbles, and hence I want to avoid the issue of money illusion.
The fundamentalist forecast is that the asset price will move back towards its fundamental
value, qt , during the next period, unless it is already close to the fundamental, dened by the
bounds C:
Ef;t (qt) = qt 1   f (qt 1   qt ) where jqt 1   qt j > C (3)
= qt 1 where jqt 1   qt j 6 C
Ef;t (qt+1) = Ef;t (qt)  f (Ef;t (qt)  qt ) where jqt 1   qt j > C (4)
= Ef;t (qt) where jqt 1   qt j 6 C
We can think of C as an uncertainty bound. Fundamentalists recognize the uncertainty inherent
in their modelling of the fundamental price and so they only take an active trading position when
the actual price is signicantly di¤erent from the fundamental value. If the actual price is already
close to fundamental (i.e. within the band dened by C) then they predict no change in the actual
price.
The contention of behavioral economics is that the level of complexity in the real world makes
it impossible for agents to fully comprehend the markets in which they trade. In such a world, the
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ex-ante use of simple rules such as those in this model may constitute a best response. However,
even in a complex world, the ex-post assessment of trading rules is relatively cheap. I therefore
impose some limited rationality in the form of an evolutionary switching procedure based on the
ex-post protability of the competing rules. Agents are assumed to assess the ex-post risk adjusted
protability, 
i;t, of each of the forecasting rules and then select the rule that they will use in the
next period. Hence, the proportions of agents using each of the rules develops according to the
following identities:
wct =
exp(
c;t)
exp(
f;t) + exp(
c;t)
(5)
wft =
exp(
f;t)
exp(
f;t) + exp(
c;t)
(6)
The parameter  represents the propensity with which agents switch between the forecasting rules.

c;t and 
f;t are the excess returns over holding bonds associated with following the chartist
forecast and the fundamentalist forecast respectively. They are calculated as follows:

c;t =

qt 1   qt 2
 
1 + rbBt 1

:sign [Ec;t 2 (qt 2)  qt 2] (7)

f;t =

qt 1   qt 2
 
1 + rbBt 1

:sign [Ef;t 2 (qt 2)  qt 2] (8)
where qt 2
 
1 + rbBt 1

represents the return to investing funds in bonds and qt 1 is the return to in-
vesting the same funds in equities. sign [Ec;t 2 (qt 2)  qt 2] takes the value -1 when Ec;t 2 (qt 2) <
qt 2, in which circumstances an agent following the chartist rule would choose to invest in bonds
rather than equities, and takes the value +1 when chartists choose equities over bonds. sign [Ef;t 2 (qt 2)  qt 2]
is analogous.
The actual asset price is determined via a bargaining process between those who favour the
chartist rule and those who favour the fundamentalist forecast:
qt = wc;tEc;t (qt) + wf;tEf;t (qt) (9)
The average expected return on capital that is implied by these behavioral forecasting rules is
that which entails that the present asset price is equal to the discounted average future expected
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asset price. In other words, it is the return, Eb;trkt+1, which satises:
qt = 
Ett+1
t

Eb;tr
k
t+1 + [wc;tEc;t (qt+1) + wf;tEf;t (qt+1)]
	
(10)
In this way, we can think of behavioral rules as driving an asset mis-pricing by inducing a bias
in the expected future return to capital.
In order to ensure the tractability of the analysis, I limit the sources of randomness in the
model to a single productivity shock.
Welfare is assessed directly, using the utilitarian notion that welfare is simply equal to the
aggregation of individual utilities.
3.1 Parameterizing the Model
My intention in this paper is to pose questions about the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy as a tool
for alleviating the damaging e¤ects of asset price bubbles. It is not to produce a model for cali-
brating the optimal policy. I, therefore, make no attempt to estimate the model. Instead, I borrow
my parameterization of the model from previous work. The parameters for the New Keynesian
aspects of the model are taken from Canzoneri et al (2007), whilst those for the behavioral aspects
are taken from ap Gwilym (2009). The baseline parameterization that I use is given in appendix
C.
4 Solving the Model
Solving this model presents very signicant challenges. I am assuming rationality in the goods and
labour markets, which means that agents are forward looking and understand the model, so that
all of the equations that describe these markets must hold in both the present period and in their
expected terms for all future periods. On the other hand, I am assuming that rationality breaks
down in the asset market. In keeping with the spirit of the behavioral nance literature, agents
make use of simple heuristical rules to determine what they consider to be a fair price for the
asset and also in determining how the asset price will behave in the future. However, due to the
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complexity of the asset market, agents do not understand the behavior of others in the market, and
so the market clearing condition only holds in the present period. It does not hold in its expected
future forms.
I can always impose some kind of asset mis-pricing. However, as long as agents understand the
mechanism which causes that mis-pricing, and they rationally expect it to persist, then all that
happens is that there is a persistent dislocation between the fundamental value of the asset and
its price. If future dislocations are fully anticipated then the net e¤ect is that the expected return
to asset-holding is unchanged. If this is the case, then there will be no distortions in the wider
economy. The key here is that it is biases to the expected return on asset holding, and not the
mis-pricing of the asset in and of itself, which drives distortions in the allocation of resources.
My approach to solving the model is to take advantage of well established techniques for
solving rational expectations models, and then introduce the non-rational aspects of the model via
shockprocesses. Shocks to the current and future expected asset price drive these variables away
from their fundamental values. Of course, these are not shocks in the conventional sense. The
behavioral model describes exactly how these deviations from fundamental are determined. As
already stated, if the agents in the model understood this behavioral process then they could form
a rational expectation of future deviations, and the asset mis-pricing would not e¤ect the wider
economy. By introducing these biases to the current and future asset price as unanticipated shocks,
they cause a bias to the expected return on capital, and thereby alter the allocations throughout
the economy.
Figure 1 summarizes the solution method. I solve the majority of the model as if it were a
rational expectations model, using the Dynare pre-processor. The solution to this Dynare sub-
model consists of a set of policy and transition functions which describe how each variable is
determined by pre-determined variables (initial conditions) and a set of shocks. There are four
shocksto the Dynare sub-model. The rst is a conventional productivity shock. There are a pair
of asset price shocks. One a¤ects the present asset price, driving a wedge between the actual
asset price and its fundamental value. The other asset price shockdrives a wedge between the
expected future asset price and its fundamental value. Combined, these two shocks have the e¤ect
of biasing the expected return on capital, which in turn drives distortions in the rest of the model.
The fourth shockis the monetary policy response to the asset mis-pricing.
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Figure 1: Solving the model
The productivity shock is treated as a random variable. The other three shocks, however, are
endogenously determined. The asset price shocksare determined by the behavioral asset pricing
rules explained above (equations 1 to 8). The monetary policy response is determined by the
Taylor rule discussed below.
Appendix B presents a preliminary analysis of the Dynare sub-model.
5 Results
In order to assess the e¤ect of including an asset price target in the monetary policy rules, I simulate
the entire model under di¤erent parameterizations of the Taylor rule. The parameterization that
I use in the benchmark model is as follows:
Rbt+1 = 0:01 + t + 2:02 (t  ) + 0:184 ln

yt
y

+ q ln

qt 1
qt 1

This is based on Canzoneri et als (2007) estimation of a Taylor rule over the Volcker and Greenspan
years as Federal Reserve chairmen (1979 - 2003). Of course, the estimated Taylor rule does not
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include a response to asset mis-pricing, so q = 0.
I run 1,000 stochastic simulations of the model under each of several di¤erent values of q. I
consider:
1. a passivemonetary regime, where there is no response to asset mis-pricings. In other words,
q = 0.
2. a variety of activeregimes with di¤erent weights, both positive and negative, on the asset
mis-pricing. The weights I consider are q = 0:05;  0:05; 0:1;  0:1; 0:5;  0:5; 1 and  1.
For each individual simulation, I run the model for forty periods. The only exogenous shock
is the productivity shock, and this is drawn at random from a normal distribution with mean
zero and standard deviation 0.00861 for each of the forty periods. I calculate the actual welfare
each period and, for the nal period, I also calculate the expected future welfare. I then discount
these values to get a measure of inter-temporal welfare for each simulation. Averaging this welfare
measure across the 1,000 simulations gives a measure of expected welfare under each alternative
monetary regime.
As is the case for any measure of welfare, the cardinal units are more or less meaningless. I
follow the convention, initiated by Lucas (2003), of calculating and reporting consumption equiv-
alents. The welfare measures for all of the results reported in this paper refer to the proportion
of consumption that households would be prepared to give up permanently, holding work e¤ort
constant, in order to live in a rational world with no asset bubbles and no associated monetary
response.
Table 1 presents the estimation of welfare in the benchmark behavioral model, under di¤erent
specications of the Taylor rule. The second column of the table states the loss in welfare relative
to the rational model under each monetary regime.
The behavioral model with a passive monetary regime (q = 0) leads to expected welfare which
is equivalent to a loss of 0.177 of one percent of permanent consumption relative to the rational
model. We can think of this as the cost of irrationality in the asset markets. I use this value as a
basis against which to compare the performance of the alternative monetary policy options.
1This parameter comes from an estimate of the 1960 - 2002 US data (with a log linear trend) by Canzoneri et al
(2007)
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Table 1: Utility cost of various Taylor rules in the benchmark model
Monetary Utility cost versus Performance
regime rational model relative to q = 0
q = (% a g e p e rm a n e n t c o n s um p t io n ) (% a g e b ia s c o r r e c t e d )
0.00 -0.177 % 0.0 %
0.05 -0.187 % -6.1 %
-0.05 -0.167 % 5.5 %
0.10 -0.199 % -12.8 %
-0.10 -0.158 % 10.5 %
0.50 -0.357 % -101.9 %
-0.50 -0.113 % 35.9 %
1.00 -1.083 % -512.8 %
-1.00 -0.113 % 36.3 %
For example, the behavioral model with a modest leaning against the windmonetary regime
of q = 0:05
2 experiences a loss in welfare relative to the rational world which is equivalent to
0.187 of one percent of permanent consumption. Compared to the passive regime, this represents
an exacerbation of the misallocation of resources which irrationality has caused. The welfare loss
is 6.1% higher than under the passive monetary regime. This measure of the performance of active
monetary policy rules relative to the passive regime is reported in the third column of table 1.
In other words, a negative number in column 3 signals a monetary policy rule that increases
the cost of behavioral biases - we can think of this as a monetary policy rule that exacerbates
those biases. On the other hand, a positive number in column 3 signals a monetary policy rule
that reduces the cost of behavioral biases - we can think of this as a monetary policy rule that
corrects for those biases.
The surprising result is that leaning against the windpolicies (policies which lead to a mon-
etary tightening when asset prices are above fundamental, and a loosening when they are below
fundamental, i.e. q > 0) exacerbate the cost of behavioral biases. Even more surprisingly, the
contrary running with the windpolicy, where an asset bubble is met with a monetary loosening,
actually ameliorates the e¤ects of the bubble. An explanation of these counter-intuitive results is
required, and I will provide this in the next section.
2This is the monetary policy response recommended by Cecchetti et al (2000)
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Before providing that explanation, I shall briey consider the signicance of the welfare losses
reported. The gures presented in table 1 seem relatively small, but if we compare them to Lucas
(2003) they are certainly not trivial. Using US data, Lucas calculates that the welfare cost of
uctuations in consumption around its trend is only about 0.05 of one percent of consumption.
Although this model, and the utility function I use, di¤ers from Lucas, this does give us some idea
of the signicance of the e¤ect of the behavioral biases in the model. Furthermore, there are two
reasons to believe that this cost is understated.
1. Firstly, the idea of using future expectations from this model as the basis for welfare com-
parisons is clearly problematical. The fact that the model is not based on fully rational
expectations means that ex-ante (or anticipated) welfare can be inconsistent with ex-post
(or realized) welfare. Given that I use expectations to estimate the e¤ect on welfare from
period 41 onwards, there are grounds to believe that this measure of welfare underestimates
the e¤ect of the behavioral biases on actual welfare. Despite the fact that later periods are
more heavily discounted, periods 41 to1 still account for around two thirds of inter-temporal
welfare.
2. Secondly, as noted earlier, the main costs associated with asset price bubbles in the real world
are as the result of credit rationing which often accompanies the bursting of a bubble. In this
model, I have no nancial market frictions which could cause such a credit crunch. The only
way in which asset mis-pricings e¤ect allocations in the real economy is via wealth e¤ects.
Hence, the fact that I derive a signicant cost to behavioral biases even in the absence of
nancial accelerator e¤ects is noteworthy.
If my intention in this paper were to try and provide a meaningful estimate of the cost of behavioral
biases, then I would clearly need to address both of these issues. In fact, my intention is not to
do that, but rather to assess the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy in correcting for behavioral
biases. In order to do this, I do not need an accurate estimate of the cost of behavioral biases, I
only need for my estimate of that cost to be consistent across monetary policy regimes. For that
reason, and given the computing power necessary to accurately measure ex-post welfare, and given
the di¢ culty of introducing nancial accelerator e¤ects into a DSGE model, I will postpone the
attempt to accurately estimate the costs of behavioral biases until further work.
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Figure 2: The productivity process and rational asset price in a simulation of the model
5.1 Intuition for the Result
In order to provide intuition for these results, I consider here a single simulation of the model.
Figure 2 shows the productivity process in this particular simulation. It also shows that the
rational asset price mimics, almost exactly, the productivity process3 . Figure 3 contrasts the asset
price in the rational model with that in the behavioral model under a passive monetary regime,
based on the same underlying productivity process. We can see that the e¤ect of the behavioral
rules is that the asset price becomes slow to react to changes in productivity. This is because
initially only fundamentalists react to the change in productivity. Chartists gradually jump on
the bandwagon, but are slow to react when there is a turning point in productivity. This type of
dynamics coincides with the type of story that is often told to explain asset price bubbles. For
example, during the late 1980s and early 1990s there was a revolution in information technology,
3The rational asset price illustrated in gure 2 is the asset price that I get when I simulate the model without
any behavioural biases. This di¤ers from the fundamental asset price under any simulation of the full model because
the behavioural rules a¤ect capital accumulation, and this in turn drives changes in what would then be a rational
asset price.
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Figure 3: The asset price in the rational model and in the behavioural model with a passive
monetary policy
largely based on the growth of the internet, which did actually drive improvements in productivity.
A plausible explanation of equity prices through the 1990s might argue that at rst there was a
slow response to the fundamental changes in productivity that were being driven by technological
progress. However, once the response started to take place it accelerated at exactly the same time
as the growth rate of productivity began to return to more normal levels. Hence, asset prices began
to outstrip their fundamental value in what came to be known as the dot-com bubble. Similar
stories have been told about the recent boom in house prices, but this time based on nancial
rather than informational innovations.
The question now is what e¤ect monetary policy has in the model. Figure 4 illustrates the
e¤ect of a leaning against the windmonetary policy, with Q = 0:5. The dashed line marked with
blobs is the monetary policy (interest rate) response to the asset mis-pricing. Monetary policy
is expansionary (low interest rate) when the asset price was below fundamental in the previous
period and it is contractionary (high interest rate) when the asset price was above fundamental in
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Figure 4: The asset price in the behavioural model with a leaning against the windmonetary
policy
the previous period. With this monetary policy response, the asset price is described by the solid
line marked with pluses. As we can see, in periods 1 to 7 of this simulation the monetary policy
response has the e¤ect of driving the asset price closer to its fundamental value (approximated
by the rational model). However, this means that when productivity growth falls o¤, in period
8, the chartist rule imparts greater momentum onto the asset price than it did under the passive
monetary regime. Therefore, when the productivity process reaches a turning point, the bubble
that develops is more pronounced. To return to my previous analogy, if the monetary authorities
had recognized the under-pricing of equities during the technological boom of the early 1990s, and
had relaxed monetary policy in response to the mis-pricing there would have been two consequences.
In the short-run the under-pricing would have been reduced. However, the faster growth in equity
prices that that would entail would have resulted in a greater momentum in asset prices when
technological progress diminished in the latter half of the decade. Hence, the dot-com bubble
would have been more pronounced than what actually occurred.
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Figure 5: The asset price in the behavioural model with a running with the windmonetary policy
Figure 5 illustrates the e¤ect of a running with the windmonetary policy, with Q =  0:5. The
dashed line marked with squares is the interest rate response to the asset mis-pricing. Monetary
policy is contractionary when the asset price was below fundamental in the previous period and
it is expansionary when the asset price was above fundamental in the previous period. With this
monetary policy response, the asset price is described by the solid green line. The e¤ect here is the
reverse of the leaning against the windpolicy. During periods 1 to 7 the asset price drifts further
away from its fundamental value. However, when productivity growth begins to fall the momentum
in the chartist forecast is less than under other policy specications, and so the resulting bubble
is less pronounced.
In this model bubbles appear when turning points in the productivity process occur. The
crucial factor in how large those bubbles turn out to be is the rate of change of the asset price in
the periods prior to any turning point. There is a momentum inherent in the chartist forecasting
rule, and this momentum is greater when the rate of change in the asset price is higher. Since a
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leaning against the windpolicy tends to promote rapid changes in asset prices, it also promotes
greater momentum in the chartist rule, and more pronounced bubbles.
5.2 Robustness Testing
In appendix D, I report the results of some robustness testing exercises. Each table in the appendix
is equivalent to table 1, but I have altered one of the parameters in the behavioral rules. I consider
di¤erent values for the propensity to switch between the forecasting rules. I also consider di¤erent
values for the uncertainty band in the fundamentalist rule, C.
The only case in which a leaning against the windpolicy increases welfare is when the switching
parameter, , is very large. Even in this case only a small response is benecial, whilst an aggressive
policy is extremely harmful.
6 Conclusions
The main result of the model that I have developed in this paper is that leaning against the wind
monetary policies are counter-productive whilst running with the windpolicies can ameliorate
the e¤ects of behavioral biases. This result is clearly model specic. It relies on the particular
characteristics of the behavioral forecasting rules on which the model is based. Although it has
been shown that these simple heuristical rules can account for historical asset price dynamics (ap
Gwilym 2009), I do not want to claim that they are a realistic description of real world nancial
markets. I, therefore, need to be cautious in drawing policy conclusions from this model.
What is clear is that leaning against the windmonetary policies cannot be relied upon to
correct for behavioral biases, and in some cases will cause serious harm. It is not so clear that
we should be supporting systematic use of running with the wind policies. It is likely that
this result is very model specic. The issue here is that the dynamics of the bubble, and the
behavioral underpinnings of those dynamics, are extremely important in determining the most
relevant policy response. The big problem, of course, is that the monetary authorities do not have
much understanding of that behavior.
21
The argument in favour of including asset price misalignments in the Taylor rule is summarized
by Cecchetti et al (2000) as follows:
when signicant asset price misalignments occur, they help to create an unde-
sirable instability in ination and/or employment that may be exacerbated when the
misalignment is eventually eliminated. A pre-emptive policy approach therefore will
tend to limit the build-up of such asset misalignments and macroeconomic imbalances,
and would also limit the required eventual correctionand thereby the medium-term
variability of ination and output.
In this paper, I have shown that pre-emptive policy cannot be relied upon to limit misalignments
across time. In the case of the model presented above, the measures required to reduce present
misalignments have the e¤ect of increasing future misalignments. Cecchetti et als intuition that a
pre-announced, systematic leaning against the windpolicy must drive asset prices closer to their
fundamental does not necessarily hold in a world where expectations are not formed rationally.
It is important to note some caveats to what I have said so far. Firstly, my model ignores any
nancial accelerator e¤ects that may exist. These would likely exacerbate the costs of sub-rational
behavior. However, they will also serve to add further complexity to the picture.
Secondly, my model does not allow for any e¤ect caused by expectations of future monetary
policy. The model does not allow for the fact that a pre-commitment to a leaning against the wind
might cause private agents to hedge against mis-pricings by shunning chartist rules. However, we
know that if there is an asset mis-pricing, it must be as the result of some irrationality in the market.
If such irrationality exists then it is unclear as to why it would not prevent agents from responding
optimally to policy pre-commitments. In Calvo-type models, monetary policy can correct for
nominal rigidities by keeping ination and expectations of ination equal, through a commitment
to an ination target. In such models, rationality reigns and the monetary authorities are able
to take advantage of this in predicting how private expectations will react to future monetary
policy. As soon as we loosen the requirement for rationality, it becomes di¢ cult for the monetary
authorities to predict how policy a¤ects private sector expectations.
Thirdly, it is important to note that in my analysis, I have only considered systematic monetary
policy rules. It may well be possible that a one o¤ monetary tightening or loosening could be
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e¤ective in increasing welfare if the monetary authorities are able to identify turning points in the
productivity process.
Bubbles can only exist in a world where agents are less than fully rational. Furthermore, the
dynamics of bubbles are dependant upon the nature of that irrationality. The relevant policy
response to a bubble depends upon the particular nature of the behavioral reaction of the market.
We have only a very rudimentary understanding of such behaviors. What we do know suggests
that such behaviors are complex and cause discontinuities in the relationships between di¤erent
variables.
For all these reasons, it is likely that any attempt by central banks to try to inuence market
psychology is likely to have highly unpredictable outcomes. A systematic monetary policy response
to asset mis-pricings is unlikely to enhance welfare because monetary authorities lack the full
information necessary to implement an e¤ective policy.
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APPENDICES
A The Model
A.1 Household Maximization
There is a continuum of households indexed by h across the unit interval. Each household maxi-
mizes its intertemporal utility function,
Uh;t = Et
1X
s=t
s t
(
ln (ch;s) 
l1+h;s
1 + 
)
where ch;t is the households real consumption of the composite good, yt, and lh;t is its di¤erentiated
labour supply. I consider a cashless economy in which households can transfer their wealth from one
time period to another by holding government bonds, bh;t, or investing in capital, kh;t. Government
bonds are one period, paying a pre-announced gross nominal return of (1+Rbt). Capital is bought
at the price Pt and has a rental return Rkt each subsequent period. Capital depreciates at the rate
 and there is a capital adjustment cost. Hence, each household faces the budget constraint:
kh;tR
k
t + bh;t(1 +R
b
t) + lh;tWh;t = ch;tPt + ih;tPt + bh;t+1
and the law of motion of capital is given by:
kh;t+1 = (1  ) kh;t + ih;t   
2

ih;t
kh;t
  
2
kh;t
where the nal term represents the cost of capital adjustment.
Due to nominal rigidities in the labour market, only a proportion of households, (1  !), are
free to adjust their wage. They choose the wage which maximizes their utility across the states of
nature for which that wage rate will hold. The remainder of the households simply update their
last period wage by the steady state gross ination rate, (1 + ).
Households sell their di¤erentiated labour in a monopolistically competitive market to a per-
fectly competitive bundler. The bundler combines the labour of the various households into aggre-
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gate labour which is employed by the rms. The bundling technology is a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator:
lt =
24 1Z
0
l
 1

h;t dh
35

 1
The bundlers cost minimization implies that each household faces the following demand for their
labour service:
lh;t =

Wh;t
Wt
 
lt
Households which are free to optimize in period t choose the wage rate, W h;t, which maximizes
utility across the states of nature for which that wage rate will hold, subject to the labour demand
curve, the budget constraint and the law of motion of capital. In other words, it maximizes:
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When wages are fully exible (i.e. ! = 0 and Wt =W h;t) this reduces to W

h;t =

 1
lt
h;t
. In other
words, the wage is a mark up over the disutility of work.
The aggregate wage is given by:
Wt =
24 1Z
0
W 1 h;t dh
35
1
1 
=
" 1X
i=0
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A.2 Firm Optimization
There is a continuum of retail rms indexed by f across the unit interval. Each rm hires bundles
of labour at the aggregate wage rate, Wt. They hire capital from the households in a perfectly
competitive factor market at the rental rate of capital, Rkt . The rms make the decision of how
much labour, lf;t, and how much capital, kf;t, to employ; and thus how much output to produce,
yf;t. They sell their output in a monopolistically competitive market at the price, Pf;t, and are
constrained by production technology.
Each rm chooses an input mix to maximize prots:
yf;tPf;t   kf;tRkt   lf;tWt
subject to its production function:
yf;t = ztk

f;tl
(1 )
f;t
Note that the technology, zt, is common across all rms. It is assumed to follow a simple stochastic
autoregressive process:
ln (zt) = % ln (zt 1) + "t "t  N (0; ")
The rms optimal inputs are:
lf;t =
(1  )yf;tPf;t
Wt
kf;t =
yf;tPf;t
Rkt
When rms charge di¤erent prices, the optimal level of inputs varies across rms. However, the
optimal capital to labour ratio is constant across rms:
kf;t
lf;t
=

(1  )
Wt
Rkt
Because of this symmetry, marginal cost is also constant across rms. It can be derived as:
MCf;t =
W 1 t R
k
t
zt(1  )(1 )
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Calvo-type nominal rigidities in the goods market, entail that in each period only a randomly
chosen fraction, (1 ), of the rms are free to reset their prices. These rms set new prices taking
their respective demand curves as given. The remainder of the retail rms cannot reoptimize, but
adjust their price by the steady state ination, (1 + ).
If a rm has the opportunity to reset its price then it chooses the new price, P f;t. The general
price level is:
Pt =
24 1Z
0
P 1 f;t df
35
1
1 
=
" 1X
i=0
(1  )i  iP f;t i1 
# 1
1 
=
h
(1  )P 1 f;t + 1 P
1 
t 1
i 1
1 
I assume the artice of a perfectly competitive goods bundler employing Dixit-Stiglitz technol-
ogy. Each individual rm, therefore, faces the demand curve:
yf;t =

Pf;t
Pt
 
yt
In periods when the rm gets the opportunity to choose a new price, it chooses the price which
maximizes its expected discounted future stream of prots across the states of nature for which
that price will hold. In other words, it maximizes:
Et
1X
s=t
()s t
s
t

ysP

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s t
P f;t
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This yields the optimal price:
P f;t =

   1
Et
1P
s=t
( (1 + )
 
)s tsP

s ysMCf;s
Et
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(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1 
)s tsP

s ys
In other words, the rm sets the price so that its expected value is equal to a mark up,  1 , over
expected marginal cost. In the case of no price stickiness (i.e.  = 0), P f;t =

 1MCf;t. This is
the standard result that under monopolistic competition rms set price as a mark up over marginal
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cost.
A.3 Aggregation
For tractability, full contingent claims markets are assumed. Given the ex-ante homogeneity of
the households, this ensures that consumption and wealth are constant across all households.
E¤ectively, risk averse households will insure against not being able to adjust their wage rate.
Hence, ch;t = ct 8h and h;t = t 8h.
It also entails that all households which are free to optimally set their wage in a given period
are in exactly the same position and will choose the same wage, W h;t =W

t 8h.
Firms which are free to set their optimal price are also all in identical positions, and so P f;t =
P t 8h. Furthermore, I have already shown that marginal cost and the capital to labour ratio are
the same across all rms.
Given that an individual rms demand and supply must be equal, and then integrating across
all rms:
yf;t = ztk

f;tl
(1 )
f;t = P

t P
 
f;t yt
1Z
0
ztk

f;tl
(1 )
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 
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1Z
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lf;tdf = ytP

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P f;t df
yt =
ztk

t l
(1 )
t
pdt
where pdt = P

t
1Z
0
P f;t df
In other words, aggregate output is a decreasing function of price dispersion, pdt.
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A.4 Asset Prices
The behavioral model of asset price determination is explained in section 3 above. The fundamen-
talist forecast in that model is premised on the fundamental asset price, qt . This is dened as the
asset price that would pertain to a world with rational expectations. It is the discounted sum of
all future rental payments to capital:
qt = Et
1X
s=t+1
s t
s
t
rks
Alternatively, this can be expressed as the discounted value of the sum of the next period rental
payment and fundamental price:
qt = Et
t+1
t

rkt+1 + q

t+1

(11)
A.5 The Government
The government sets the nominal interest rate according to a Taylor rule which includes a response
to the most recent asset mis-pricing:
Rbt+1 = r
b +t +  (t  ) + Y ln

yt
y

+ Q ln

qt 1
qt 1

The response is to the asset mis-pricing in period t   1 because we are in a world in which
asset prices cannot easily be predicted. In rational models, policy can react to current variables,
which in turn depend upon policy, because all variables are determined simultaneously. There is
an implicit assumption that agents costlessly form entire response functions and costlessly and
instantaneously adjust their trading volumes in response to price signals. This is inconsistent with
the essence of behavioral economics. In the behavioral world, the government cannot perfectly
anticipate how private agents will respond to its policy prescriptions. Hence, the simultaneous
realization of monetary policy and asset prices is not within the spirit of a behavioral model.
Equivalently, a solution method for such a system of equations would require the imposition of
some concept of rational consistency. The Taylor rule that is most compatible with the spirit of
behavioral modelling, therefore, is one in which the monetary authorities react to the mis-pricing
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from the previous period.
The aim in this paper is to assess whether the central bank should take account of asset prices in
setting monetary policy. I will do this by comparing the welfare e¤ects of various parameterizations
of the weight on the asset price, Q.
A.6 Welfare
I use a strictly utilitarian notion of welfare, dening it as aggregate utility:
Ut =
Z 1
0
Uh;t dh
= Et
1X
s=t
s t
(Z 1
0
ln (ch;s) dh 
R 1
0
l1+h;s dh
1 + 
)
Given the assumption of complete contingent claims markets, consumption is constant across all
households. Therefore, the aggregate (or average) utility derived from consumption is just the
same as the utility of consumption for any individual household. However, given price stickiness,
rms employ di¤erent amounts of labour from di¤erent households, and so the aggregate disutility
of labour is not straightforwardly related to the disutility of an individual household. I calculate
it as follows:
R 1
0
l1+h;s dh
1 + 
=
R 1
0

W t W
 
h;t lt
1+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1 + 
=
l1+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where wdt =W
(1+)
t
R 1
0
W
 (1+)
h;t dh is a measure of wage dispersion.
Therefore, welfare is given by:
Ut = Et
1X
s=t
s t

ln (cs)  l
1+
s wds
1 + 

We can clearly see that nominal rigidities have an adverse e¤ect on welfare. Wage dispersion
directly increases the aggregate disutility of work. Price dispersion, on the other hand, indirectly
reduces welfare by reducing aggregate output, and hence consumption.
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B Preliminary Analysis of the Dynare sub-model
The dynare sub-model consists of:
1. A set of rational equations which is made up of the household and rm optimizations,
production constraint, market clearing conditions, monetary policy rule, welfare denition
and the rational asset pricing equation 11.
2. A set of behavioralequations that is made up of exactly the same features except:
 the asset price, qBt , is set equal to its fundamental value (the asset price from the
rationalequations, qRt ) plus an asset price shockterm, "
q
t .
 the expected future asset price, qBFt , is set equal to its fundamental value (the expected
future asset price from the rationalequations, EtqRt+1) plus an expected asset price
shockterm, "qFt .
 the return on capital is derived from the asset price and expected future asset price via
equation 8.
The variables in this part of the model are denoted with a B superscript. Note that the
expected future asset price, qBFt , is not a rational expectation of the value that the asset
price, qBt , will take in the next period. This is where the lack of rationality enters the model,
and it permeates the behavioralequations by biasing the expected return on capital:
Etr
kB
t+1 =
qBt

Rt
Et
B
t+1
  qBFt
3. A standard productivity process.
In this way, I have two, almost distinct, sets of equations. The rational set, along with
the productivity process, constitute an independent model in which all expectations are formed
rationally. These equations do not depend upon the behavioralequations in any way, and can
be solved separately. The behavioralequations, on the other hand require the fundamental asset
price and rationally expected future asset price as pre-determined inputs if they are to be solved.
The dynare sub-model can be solved to provide a set of functions which determine how that
models variables depend on predetermined variables and the four dynare shocks: the asset price
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shock, "qt ; the expected asset price shock, "
qF
t ; the policy response, "
MP
t ; and the productivity
shock, "t. In this way I get functions which I can iterate to nd the time paths of variables in the
model, once I have determined the size of the shocks. These are determined by the behavioral
sub-model, the Taylor rule and the productivity process.
Here, I present and briey analyze the impulse responses to all four shocks in the dynare
sub-model.
Figure 6: Impulse responses to a 1% productivity shock (i.e. "1 = 0:01)
Figure 6 shows the responses of some key variables to a 1% productivity shock, with an auto-
regressive component, %, of 0.95. Given that there are no asset price shocks, the behavioral
variables in dynare follow exactly the same path as their rationalcounterparts. The direct e¤ect
of the increase in productivity increases output, y, by 1% in period 1. Output actually rises by
more than this because the productivity shock also a¤ects the employment of capital and labour.
It increases the productivity of both capital, k, and labour, l, which in turn lead to increases in
investment and the demand for labour. The increase in permanent income drives up consumption,
33
c, and reduces the supply of labour. In the periods immediately following the shock, the expansion
in demand for labour outweighs the contraction in supply, but this is eventually reversed with
the quantity of labour falling below its steady state value from around period 5. Discreet period
utility, v, is driven mainly by changes in consumption, which are of an order of magnitude greater
than the changes in labour. Initially, the return on capital and expected future return on capital
are driven up by the productivity shock as the employment of labour increases rapidly, and the
accumulation of capital lags behind. By period 9, however, su¢ cient capital has been accumulated
so that the returns to capital have fallen back below their steady state level, as productivity falls
back towards its steady state level. The asset price, q, shoots up in response to the productivity
shock and gradually falls back to its steady state level. This is perfectly anticipated (see Etqt+1)
since there are no other shocks after period 1.
Figure 7: Impulse responses to a 1% shock to the current asset price (i.e. "q1 = 0:01)
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Figure 8: Impulse responses to a 1% shock to the expected future asset price (i.e. "qF1 = 0:01)
Figure 7 shows the response to a transitory 1% shock to the current asset price, whilst gure 8
shows the response to a transitory 1% shock to the future expected asset price. These represent the
biases to the asset price that are determined within the behavioral model. In the dynare model,
they have no direct e¤ect on the rationalvariables4 . These two shocks do not occur in isolation in
the full dynamic simulations of the model that we will discuss later, but for now we will consider the
impulse responses separately. A positive shock to the current asset price discourages investment,
boosting consumption and reducing labour supply in period 1. The under-accumulation of capital
reduces output and consumption in subsequent periods.
A positive shock to the future expected asset price has the e¤ect of increasing labour supply
and reducing consumption in order to fund investment in capital, which is brought forward in
anticipation of an over-pricing of capital in the next period. This drives down present period utility.
4However, it is worth noting that they do a¤ect the accumulation of capital in the full model, and hence a¤ect the
initial conditions for subsequent time periods. In this way, these shocks do have an e¤ect on future fundamentals.
35
Intertemporal utility increases, though it is important to note that this is ex-ante intertemporal
utility. In e¤ect, we have a shock to expectations which is a wedge between ex-ante and ex-post
returns to capital and which also drives a wedge between ex-ante and ex-post intertemporal utility.
In fact, by the time agents reach period 2 and recognize their mistaken beliefs in period 1, they
have already accumulated extra capital which advantages them in period 2 and henceforth, though
not to the extent that they had anticipated in period 1.
Figure 9: Impulse responses to a 1% shock to the Taylor rule (i.e. "MP1 = 0:01)
Figure 9 shows the response to a 1% transitory shock to the Taylor rule. As with the produc-
tivity shock, the monetary policy shockin isolation does not cause the rational and behavioral
variables in the dynare model to diverge - it a¤ects the equivalent variables in exactly the same
way. If the nominal interest rate is set above its steady state value then, in the presence of price
rigidities, the real return to bond-holding increases and agents substitute out of capital and into
bonds. The decrease in capital reduces the marginal productivity of labour, and hence labour falls.
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A fall in output, consumption and utility ensues.
C Parameters for the Benchmark Model
Intertemporal discount factor:  = 0.99
Elasticity in the goods aggregator:  = 7.00
Work disutility coe¢ cient = 1 + ;  = 3.00
Probability Calvo fairy does not visit price setter:  = 0.67
Probability Calvo fairy does not visit wage setter: ! = 0.75
Inertia in productivity shock:  = 0.95
Elasticity in the labour aggregator:  = 7.00
Depreciation rate:  = 0.025
Coe¢ cient in adjustment cost for investment:  = 8.00
Share of capital in the production function:  = 0.25
Chartist rule parameter: c =
0:99
1:99
Fundamentalist rule parameter: f = 0.50
Uncertainty bound in fundamentalist rule: C = 0.00
Propensity to switch between forecasting rules:  = 3.75
Taylor rule weight on ination:  = 2.02
Taylor rule weight on output gap: Y = 0.184
Taylor rule weight on asset mis-pricing: Q = various
Standard deviation of productivity shock:  = 0.0086
D Robustness Tests
Table 2: Utility cost of various Taylor rules in the model with no switching between forecasting
rules
Di¤erence compared to benchmark model:  = 0
Utility cost versus Performance
Q rational model relative to Q = 0
(% a g e p e rm a n e n t c o n s um p t io n ) (% a g e b ia s c o r r e c t e d )
0.00 -0.184 % 0.0 %
0.05 -0.197 % -6.6 %
-0.05 -0.173 % 6.2 %
0.10 -0.211 % -14.6 %
-0.10 -0.163 % 11.8 %
0.50 -0.412 % -123.2 %
-0.50 -0.111 % 39.9 %
1.00 -1.642 % -790.5 %
-1.00 -0.101 % 45.5 %
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Table 3: Utility cost of various Taylor rules in the model with rapid switching between forecasting
rules
Di¤erence compared to benchmark model:  = 100
Utility cost versus Performance
Q rational model relative to Q = 0
(% a g e p e rm a n e n t c o n s um p t io n ) (% a g e b ia s c o r r e c t e d )
0.00 -0.233 % 0.0 %
0.05 -0.186 % 20.2 %
-0.05 -0.293 % -25.6 %
0.10 -0.165 % 29.5 %
-0.10 -0.358 % -53.4 %
0.50 -3.815 % -1534.4 %
-0.50 -0.595 % -154.9 %
1.00 NA % NA %
-1.00 -0.895 % -283.6 %
Table 4: Utility cost of various Taylor rules in the model with a 1 percent uncertainty bound
around the fundamentalist forecast
Di¤erence compared to benchmark model: C = 0:01
Utility cost versus Performance
Q rational model relative to Q = 0
(% a g e p e rm a n e n t c o n s um p t io n ) (% a g e b ia s c o r r e c t e d )
0.00 -0.163 % 0.0 %
0.05 -0.176 % -7.9 %
-0.05 -0.153 % 6.4 %
0.10 -0.190 % -16.3 %
-0.10 -0.143 % 12.5 %
0.50 -0.373 % -129.1 %
-0.50 -0.097 % 40.2 %
1.00 NA % NA %
-1.00 -0.114 % 30.3 %
Table 5: Utility cost of various Taylor rules in the model with a 10 percent uncertainty bound
around the fundamentalist forecast
Di¤erence compared to benchmark model: C = 0:1
Utility cost versus Performance
Q rational model relative to Q = 0
(% a g e p e rm a n e n t c o n s um p t io n ) (% a g e b ia s c o r r e c t e d )
0.00 -0.130 % 0.0 %
0.05 -0.190 % -46.0 %
-0.05 -0.090 % 30.5 %
0.10 -0.285 % -119.2 %
-0.10 -0.063 % 51.5 %
0.50 NA % NA %
-0.50 -0.004 % 97.0 %
1.00 NA % NA %
-1.00 -0.059 % 54.4 %
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